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E
xports have become an increasingly impor-
tant source of revenue for both national and
regional firms in the United States. U.S.
exports are rising rapidly, especially from the Mid-
west.
1 As a result, national and district firms must
be ever more attentive to changes in U.S. export
markets. One such change is the rapid growth of
U.S. export markets in the developing nations of
East Asia and Latin America.
This article analyzes current trends in the geo-
graphic distribution of U.S. exports and identifies
the primary growth markets for U.S. exports in the
years ahead. The analysis suggests the developing
nations in East Asia and Latin America will soon
rival today’s industrialized nations as the most im-
portant U.S. trading partners. This finding presents
U.S. firms with a significant challenge. To take
advantage of these growing markets, U.S. firms
must establish new distribution networks, learn for-
eign regulations and customs, and train sales per-
sonnel in these developing geographic regions.
Because such tasks require commitments of time
and investment, firms must be able to forecast
where the future demand for U.S. exports will be
concentrated.
The first section of this article gives an over-
view of the rapid growth of U.S. exports and their
geographic shift toward developing nations. To as-
sess the prospects for U.S. export growth in devel-
oped and developing nations, the second section
analyzes recent trends and uses a statistical model
to predict future U.S. export patterns.
RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. EXPORTS
Two trends in recent U.S. export performance
are particularly notable. First, U.S. exports have
increased rapidly relative to total U.S. output—a
development with important implications for the
entire economy. Approximately 130,000 U.S.
firms, employing over 10 million domestic work-
ers, export their products (U.S. Bureau of the
Census). Second, the geographic distribution of
U.S. exports has been shifting dramatically. The
industrialized nations of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
account for about 57 percent of all U.S. exports.
However, in recent years the share of U.S. exports
to major trading partners in East Asia and Latin
America has been rising and now accounts for 26
percent of the total.
2 Thus, economic policymakers
can no longer make trade-related decisions without
considering their effect on U.S. exports to East Asia
and Latin America.
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Exports have not always been vital to the U.S.
economy. For more than 20 years after World War
II, U.S. exports remained a relatively fixed share of
total U.S. output (Chart 1). U.S. export growth was
slow to develop after the war because many of the
world’s industrialized countries, our traditional
trading partners, found their economic and trading
relationships severely disrupted by the war. The
upheaval disrupted income growth in these coun-
tries and restrained U.S. exports. However, U.S.
export volume began a substantial upward trend in
the early 1970s. This trend was interrupted from
1981 to 1987 when the dollar appreciated signifi-
cantly and the international debt crisis suppressed
foreign demand for U.S. goods. More recently, U.S.
exports have resumed their rise and are now playing
a larger role in the domestic economy.
1973-81. U.S. exports began to swell in 1973
after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system
of fixed exchange rates. Completed in 1944 as the
basis for a postwar system of international finance,
the Bretton Woods agreement required its signatory
countries to fix their exchange rates around a par
value. The U.S. dollar was pegged to gold at $35
per ounce. However, during the 1960s and early
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68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYwith the commitment to maintain a fixed exchange
rate at the predetermined par value. As a result, the
U.S. dollar became significantly overvalued rela-
tive to key foreign currencies.
4 The United States
and other nations were finally unable to sustain
exchange market intervention to maintain the par
values of their currencies and in 1973 allowed
exchange rates to float. As the U.S. dollar depreci-
ated, the foreign price of U.S. exports fell and the
demand for U.S. goods abroad began to accelerate.
Another significant stimulus to U.S. export
growth since the early 1970s has been trade liber-
alization.
5 Trade protection has generally dimin-
ished since the 1930s when high tariffs, epitomized
by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act, stifled world
trade and output.
6 The movement toward trade lib-
eralization finally gained strong momentum in
1973 with the Tokyo Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. Although six
GATT negotiating rounds preceded it, the Tokyo
Round encompassed more than twice the number
of countries and almost four times as much trade as
the largest prior round (Table 1). More recently,
many developing nations have joined the GATT and
lowered their barriers against U.S. exports. GATT
membership has grown from an original 23 signa-
tory countries in 1947 to more than 100, over two-
thirds of which are developing countries (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
1981-87. Two factors temporarily stemmed the
rising tide of U.S. exports during the early to mid-
1980s. First, the U.S. dollar began to appreciate
significantly in 1981 as the United States enacted a
restrictive monetary policy and an expansionary
fiscal policy.
7 From 1981 to 1985, the dollar rose
almost 50 percent, thus making U.S. exports more
expensive relative to foreign goods (Hakkio and
Whittaker). Second, the international debt crisis
culminated in 1982 when Mexico announced a
moratorium on its debt payments to commercial
Table 1
GATT Negotiating Rounds
Round Starting date of round Number of countries
Value of trade covered
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Geneva 1947 23 10
Annecy 1949 33 NA
Torquay 1950 34 NA
Geneva 1956 22 2.5
Dillon 1961 45 4.9
Kennedy 1964 48 40
Tokyo 1973 99 155
Uruguay 1986 117 755
NA: not available.
Source: Bhagwati; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 69creditors. The debt crisis dramatically reduced income
in many developing countries, especially Latin Amer-
ica, thereby paring the demand for U.S. exports.
1987-92. U.S. exports resumed their upward
trend in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The dollar
depreciated substantially after the major industrial-
ized nations agreed to coordinate their economic
policies in the Plaza Agreement of 1985 and the
Louvre Accord of 1987. In the Latin American
debtor countries, policy reforms stabilized financial
conditions and per capita income growth began to
recover in 1987 (Edwards 1994). As a result, U.S.
exports to Latin America more than doubled from
1987 to 1992.
The geographic shift in U.S. exports
As total U.S. exports have been growing, the
geographic distribution of U.S. exports has been
shifting dramatically toward certain regions of de-
veloping nations. At the vanguard of this shift was
East Asia. Rapid income growth and increased trade
liberalization have transformed the developing na-
tions of East Asia into a dynamic market for U.S.
exports. The successful development of East Asia
has influenced other developing countries, most
notably in Latin America, to adopt similar policies
for economic growth (Schadler). As a result, the
developing nations of Latin America have also be-
come important markets for U.S. exports.
The traditional U.S. trading partners are the
industrialized countries of the OECD, but the de-
veloping countries of East Asia and Latin America
are closing the gap. From 1973 to 1992, real U.S.
exports to the OECD slightly more than doubled,
increasing 4.5 percent annually (Chart 2). During
the same period, U.S. exports to East Asia increased
four and a half fold, or 8.4 percent annually. Mean-
while, U.S. exports to Latin America rose threefold,
or 6.0 percent annually.
As a result, the share of U.S. exports to East
Asia and Latin America has increased relative to the
OECD share. In 1992, U.S. exports to East Asia and
Latin America accounted for 26.1 percent of total
U.S. exports, about half of the OECD’s 57.2 percent
share. However, the share of U.S. exports to East
Asia and Latin America has increased substantially
in recent years, while the share to the OECD has
actually fallen. From 1973 to 1992, the share of U.S.
exports to the OECD shrank 4.6 percentage points,
while the share of U.S. exports to East Asia and
Latin America swelled 8.1 percentage points. The
developing country share would have risen even
more if U.S. exports to Latin America and East
Asia had not been temporarily depressed by the
debt crisis.
In the absence of such external shocks, the
demand for U.S. exports is determined by funda-
mental economic factors. Three factors have been
instrumental in expanding the share of U.S. goods
exported to developing countries in East Asia and
Latin  America. First, rapid per capita income
growth in these developing nations has made U.S.
exports more affordable. Second, strong population
growth in East Asia and Latin America has ex-
panded market size by increasing the number of
consumers. Third, trade liberalization has enlarged
U.S. export markets in East Asia and Latin America
by creating or increasing access to previously re-
stricted market segments.
Per capita income growth. A nation can in-
crease its aggregate income in two ways—either by
increasing the amount of output per person (produc-
tivity growth) or by increasing the number of people
(population growth). Both sources of growth are
important factors in determining overall market size
for U.S. exports. However, real per capita income
growth is the basis for long-term improvement in a
nation’s standard of living. In this context, real per
capita income is defined to be real GDP per person.
Real per capita income growth in East Asia has
been unprecedented by historical standards. For
example, during the industrial revolution of the 19th
century, Great Britain and the United States paced
the world with annual per capita income growth
rates of 1.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively, from 1820
to 1913 (Maddison). At that rate of growth, the
70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYUnited States and Great Britain doubled their levels
of GDP per capita in an average of 50 years. In
contrast, today’s leading developing economies in
East Asia commonly register annual real income
growth rates of 6 to 7 percent. Such rates allowed
South Korea to double its GDP per capita in only
11 years, from 1966 to 1977.
Growth in per capita income has consistently
been the most important source of aggregate real
income growth in East Asia (Table 2). From 1973
to 1981, real per capita income grew 5.5 percent
annually in East Asia, almost three times the com-
parable rate in the OECD. In recent years, East
Asia’s real per capita income growth has slowed
only marginally and remains more than double the
OECD rate. As a result, several developing nations
in East Asia have already surpassed some members
of the OECD in their level of real per capita GDP.
8
For example, real per capita GDP is now higher in
Hong Kong than in 14 OECD countries.
One of the most important elements in promot-
ing long-term per capita income growth is a high
rate of domestic investment.
9 A high rate of invest-
ment permits an economy to accumulate additional
capital and increase its capital-to-labor ratio.
10 The
more productive capital that each worker employs,
the more output that worker can produce in a given
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 71investment has grown significantly faster in the
developing nations of East Asia than in the indus-
trialized nations of the OECD (Table 3). From 1973
to 1981, real gross domestic investment increased
8.9 percent annually in East Asia, seven times the
comparable rate in the OECD. Although it slowed
to 4.4 percent annually from 1981 to 1987, the
growth rate of real domestic investment in East Asia
rose again to 10.1 percent annually from 1987 to
1992. This growth was almost four times the annual
investment rate in the OECD from 1987 to 1992,
and a major factor why East Asia has sustained rapid
real per capita income growth.
11
In Latin America, however, strong real per
capita income growth in the 1970s yielded to strains
from the debt crisis of the 1980s. From 1973 to
1981, real per capita income grew 3.0 percent an-
nually in Latin America, significantly faster than in
the OECD. However, from 1981 to 1987 real per
capita income in Latin America actually declined.
Real per capita income has only recently begun to
recover in Latin America, rising 1.5 percent annu-
ally from 1987 to 1992.
Numerous developing countries, including
many in East Asia, incurred substantial debt prob-
lems in the early 1980s. Latin America was hit
particularly hard by the crisis. Its effects lingered in
Latin America primarily because appropriate ad-
justment policies were implemented much later
than in East Asia (Sachs). For example, both Korea
and Mexico borrowed heavily during the 1970s,
primarily to finance public sector spending. How-
ever, Korea enacted a tight fiscal policy in 1979 as
part of a comprehensive stabilization program. In
contrast, Mexico actually increased its public sector
expenditures by 14 percent of GDP from 1979 to
1981. As a result, the level of debt exploded and
Latin America could not follow East Asia in sus-
taining its prior growth performance.
The debt crisis reduced U.S. exports to Latin
America in two ways. First, the large fiscal deficits
led to a crowding-out of private investment and to
Table 2
Real Income, Population, and U.S. Exports, 1973-92
Average annual percent growth
1973-81 1981-87 1987-92
GDP per








 capita  Population
U.S.
exports
OECD 1.86 .78 3.79 2.26 .59 2.43 2.04 .84 8.04
East Asia 5.45 1.95 9.11 5.01 1.72 2.71 5.19 1.58 14.28
Latin
America 3.04 2.61 9.85 -2.11 2.15 -4.67 1.47 1.90 13.56
Note: Growth in GDP per capita for 1991 and 1992 was calculated using growth rates of aggregate real GDP for each
country.
Source: Author’s calculations. Data from Penn World Tables 5.5 (Summers and Heston); World Bank 1994a;
International Monetary Fund 1994.
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(International Monetary Fund 1987).
12 For exam-
ple, from 1981 to 1987 real domestic investment in
Latin America fell 4.9 percent annually (Table 3).
The decline in investment spending was exacer-
bated by severe capital flight from the debtor coun-
tries and a sharp curtailment in lending from foreign
creditors.
13 Among major debtor countries, the
share of investment financed by external borrowing
fell from 23 percent in 1981 to 1 percent in 1984
(International Monetary Fund 1985). As investment
declined in these countries, so too did per capita
income growth and the demand for U.S. exports.
For example, U.S. exports to Latin America fell 4.7
percent annually from 1981 to 1987 (Table 2).
The second way the debt crisis curtailed U.S.
exports to Latin America was through the process
of current account adjustment. After external lend-
ing was sharply reduced by foreign creditors, debtor
countries were compelled to increase their foreign
exchange earnings to repay their external debts. In
other words, exports had to exceed imports in debt-
or countries. In Latin America, 100 percent of the
net trade balance increase between 1980 and 1986
was achieved by reducing imports (Edwards 1989).
In effect, Latin America dramatically reduced its
consumption of U.S. (and other) exports.
Population growth. The second factor promot-
ing the shift in U.S. exports to East Asia and Latin
America has been population growth. Along with
increasing per capita income, population growth is
an important consideration for U.S. firms seeking
to identify regions with expanding markets.
Population growth has been a strong and con-
sistent contributor to economic growth in the devel-
oping nations of East Asia and Latin America. From
1973 to 1992, annual population growth was two to
three times higher in East Asia than in the OECD.
Population growth has been even more important
to Latin America’s expansion. From 1973 to 1981,
population growth accounted for almost half of
Latin America’s aggregate real income growth (Table
2). In addition, when real per capita income growth
turned negative in Latin America during the early
1980s, population growth remained strong and ame-
liorated the decline in U.S. exports to the region.
Trade liberalization. Access to foreign markets
is the third crucial factor in the growth of U.S.
exports. Strong foreign income and population
growth offer no opportunities for domestic firms
Table 3
Real Gross Domestic Investment, 1973-92
Average annual percent growth
1973-81 1981-87 1987-92
United States   .90 2.84   .02
OECD 1.25 3.08 2.59
East Asia 8.86 4.37 10.13
Latin America 7.31 -4.92 6.13
Source: Author’s calculations. Data from World Bank 1994a.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 73that export unless their goods can be sold in foreign
markets at competitive prices. Thus, it is important
that developing nations in both Latin America and
East Asia have made significant strides toward trade
liberalization.
East Asia was at the forefront of developing
countries in implementing trade liberalization mea-
sures. For example, given their status as entrepôt
city-states and lack of natural resources, both Hong
Kong and Singapore have depended on free trade
for their economic expansion. As a result, Hong
Kong and Singapore have long been among the
most open countries in the world. After a brief
experiment with import-substituting industrializa-
tion, Singapore began to liberalize its trade in the
late 1960s (Noland).
14 Hong Kong liberalized even
earlier, adopting free trade in 1949 along with other
laissez-faire policies of its British colonial govern-
ment (The Economist 1989).
Latin American economies, once among the most
protected in the world, have more recently emulated
the East Asian countries in liberalizing trade. Mexico,
already the third-largest market for U.S. exports,
offers a vivid illustration of the benefits of lowering
trade barriers. As recently as 1985, import licenses
protected more than 90 percent of Mexico’s domes-
tic  production  from competing imports (Lustig,
Bosworth, and Lawrence). Mexico embarked upon
large-scale trade reform in mid-1985 and methodi-
cally reduced import licensing to only 19 percent of
domestic production by 1990 (Lustig).
Many developing countries in Latin America
have also initiated moves to liberalize trade through
the GATT. Since 1980, almost half of all new acces-
sions to the GATT have been Latin American na-
tions.
15 In the process, these Latin American nations
have agreed to substantial tariff reductions. At the
time of their accessions, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Costa Rica all committed to tariff ceilings, the
highest of which was 55 percent (OECD 1992).
These trade liberalization measures contrast starkly
with developments in the OECD. Over the last
decade, 20 out of 24 OECD member nations have
increased their trade barriers (Bergsten and Noland).
In summary, exports have become increasingly
important to the U.S. economy. The growth in U.S.
exports has been accompanied by a geographic shift
toward the developing nations of East Asia and
Latin America. Although briefly interrupted by exter-
nal shocks in the 1980s, three primary factors have
precipitated the geographic shift in U.S. exports.
Per capita income growth, population growth, and
increased trade liberalization have all contributed
to faster market expansion in East Asia and Latin
America than in the OECD. In fact, these same three
factors point toward bright prospects for future U.S.
export growth in East Asia and Latin America.
PROSPECTS FOR U.S. EXPORTS TO
EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA
The developing nations of East Asia and Latin
America will continue to become more important
markets for U.S. exports in the years ahead. Spurred
by recent investment growth, strong real income
growth in these developing nations is likely to
continue. Rapid income growth in East Asia and
Latin America has important implications for U.S.
exports  because fast-growing countries tend to
import a higher proportion of goods than slow-
growing countries (Plosser). In addition, current
trends toward increased trade liberalization will
allow U.S. exports greater access, while per capita
income growth and population growth expand mar-
ket size in these developing nations.
Per capita income growth
Rapid per capita income growth will remain an
important factor in making East Asia and Latin
America key U.S. export markets. East Asia’s rapid
income growth has already made U.S. officials take
notice. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown has
said, “These [East Asian] nations are the fastest
growing markets for U.S. goods, and if we are to
expand the share of world markets claimed by
74 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYAmerican companies and workers, it will occur in
these countries” (Daily Report for Executives). In
addition, recent policy reforms in Latin America
have already begun to restore real income growth and
have greatly improved the prospects for future gains.
Current forecasts indicate that East Asia will
continue to set the pace for real income growth in
the decade ahead (Table 4). During the next ten
years, real GDP in the developing nations of East
Asia is expected to grow 7.6 percent annually, over
two and a half times as fast as in the United States
or the OECD.
16 Income growth at these rates makes
for a large potential market for U.S. exports. For
instance, when converted at purchasing power par-
ity exchange rates, China already has the third
largest GDP in the world (International Monetary
Fund 1993). This has led some to suggest that China
will be an emerging economic superpower in the
21st century (Burt).
Recent policy reforms have also restored the
potential for rapid income growth in Latin Amer-
ica.
17 The developing economies in Latin America
have made significant progress in restoring macro-
economic stability through deficit and inflation re-
duction. Chile, Mexico, and Colombia all recorded
fiscal surpluses by the late 1980s, while Argentina
reduced its deficit from 8 percent of GDP in 1980-
82 to 3 percent in 1985-88 (Williamson). With the
onset of Economic Solidarity Pact reforms, Mex-
ico’s monthly inflation rate was reduced from 10
percent to 1 percent during 1988 (Lustig).
Latin America initiated a second set of policy
reforms in privatizing state-owned firms. For exam-
ple, after nationalizing all but two of Mexico’s
commercial banks in 1982, the government has
completely privatized the banking system (Welch
and Gruben). From 1982 to 1992, the number of
public firms in Mexico fell from 1,155 to 217
(Banco de Mexico). The process of privatization
has reallocated a large amount of capital from inef-
ficient state enterprises to more promising private
ventures. As a result, Latin American investment is
now better able to spur rapid per capita income
growth.
While these reforms have been relatively recent,
experience has shown that U.S. exports to a nation
can grow rapidly after reforms have been adopted.
Reforms were implemented in some of East Asia’s
Table 4







United States 2.7 6.0 .95 .79
OECD 2.7 5.9 .51 .23
East Asia 7.6 11.5 1.32 .84
Latin America 3.4 9.6 1.94 1.18
Sources: World Bank 1993, 1994b; World Bank, International Economics Department; Day.
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example, prior to its economic reforms begun in
1978, China was a relatively small market for U.S.
exports, consuming less than a billion dollars per
year. By 1992, however, just 14 years after the first
economic reforms, U.S. exports to China increased
ninefold to almost $7.5 billion.
18 In an additional
parallel to China, foreign capital has been flowing
into Latin America in large amounts recently, a sign
of investor confidence in the progress of policy
reform and the region’s growth prospects.
19
Population growth
Over the next three decades, population growth
worldwide is expected to moderate. However, popu-
lation growth in East Asia and Latin America will
continue to outpace the OECD by a wide margin.
Current forecasts suggest that the population in
East Asia will expand 1.3 percent annually through
the year 2000. This growth is more than two and a
half times as fast as in the OECD (Table 4). Al-
though projected to slow thereafter, East Asia’s
population growth is expected to be more than three
and a half times the OECD rate by 2030.
Population growth is also expected to remain
robust in Latin America well into the 21st century,
thus expanding the potential market for U.S. exports.
Current projections indicate that Latin American
population will grow about 1.9 percent annually
during the 1990s, among the most rapid in the
world. At that rate, by the year 2000 about 8.6
percent of the world’s population is likely to live
directly south of the U.S. border. Although its growth
rate is forecast to moderate somewhat after that,
Latin America’s population is projected to swell
from the current 453 million to 765 million by 2030.
Trade liberalization
Trade liberalization improves the prospects for
U.S. exports in two ways. First, lower foreign trade
barriers directly increase U.S. access to growing
markets. Second, trade liberalization indirectly
benefits U.S. exports by increasing foreign eco-
nomic  growth and, hence, the potential demand for
U.S. exports.
Although several East Asian nations are al-
ready among the most open of all developing na-
tions, further progress in trade liberalization is
spreading throughout the region. Given their small
size and prominent role as trading centers, Hong
Kong and Singapore have traditionally been two of
the most open markets in the world. In Korea, the
average tariff for all industries was cut in half from
36 percent in 1978 to 18 percent in 1988 (Yoo).
Korea plans further tariff reductions to 7.9 percent
in 1994 (Noland). The relatively high level of re-
maining trade barriers in East Asia suggests that
additional liberalization would provide a substan-
tial boost to U.S. exports. The level of protection in
manufacturing industries in several East Asian
countries is approximately equivalent to 40 percent
tariffs (The Economist 1994). Thus, there is sub-
stantial room for U.S. exports to expand in the wake
of further trade liberalization.
The movement toward free trade is also gaining
momentum in Latin America. The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) just took effect on
January 1, 1993. The ensuing gradual phaseout of
trade barriers will provide increasingly open mar-
kets for U.S. goods. Independent studies have esti-
mated the NAFTA’s trade barrier reductions, in
conjunction with continued policy reforms in Mex-
ico, will increase U.S. exports by $16.7 billion per
year starting in 1995 (Hufbauer and Schott 1992).
The movement to reduce barriers to U.S. exports
is spreading throughout other Latin American coun-
tries as well. President Clinton recently asked the
U.S. Congress for the authority to begin fast-track
negotiations to include Chile in the NAFTA. In
addition, a recent report by the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics found that Chile and Trinidad and
Tobago are in prime position to enter into a free
trade agreement with the United States (Hufbauer
and Schott 1994). Moreover, U.S. trade negotia-
76 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtions in Latin America are unlikely to end there. The
President has said, “We ought to move next on this
free trade agreement with Chile and that could be a
model for all of South America” (Telerate 1994a).
It is estimated that a free trade pact encompassing
the western hemisphere would raise U.S. exports by
an additional $36 billion in 2002 (Dunne). On the
basis of these and other factors, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Mickey Kantor has predicted that by the
year 2000 the United States will conduct more trade
with Latin America than with Europe (Telerate
1994b).
In addition, several other developing nations in
Latin America are currently applying for GATT
membership. These new applications give strong
reason to expect additional progress in trade liber-
alization in the near future. Moreover, Latin Ameri-
can nations have strong incentives to reduce trade
barriers, since trade liberalization is likely to add
several percentage points to the region’s economic
growth rate in the 1990s (Malpass). U.S. firms are
particularly well positioned to benefit from Latin
American trade liberalization because of their geo-
graphic proximity to those markets.
Trade liberalization has the added benefit of
increasing economic growth and thereby expanding
the potential market for U.S. exports. There is in-
creasing evidence, for example, of a direct positive
link between East Asia’s openness and its rate of
economic growth (Trehan). In general, open Asian
economies have grown faster than those that were
more closed (Helliwell). Specifically, trade liberali-
zation encouraged economic growth in Korea and
Thailand by increasing economies of scale and
capacity utilization (OECD 1992). In addition, by
exposing domestic industries to greater foreign
competition, trade liberalization in East Asia may
also stimulate productivity and, hence, income
growth (The Economist 1993). Recent projections
suggest that trade liberalization will indeed increase
economic growth in East Asia. East Asia stands to
gain the most from the liberalization measures in
the recent GATT agreement, which will add an
estimated $300 billion per year to world income
(World Bank 1994b). Other estimates suggest that
if current tariff levels were reduced by half, East
Asia’s income would rise by $100 billion per year
(The Economist 1994).
In short, the prospects for future U.S. export
growth in the developing nations of East Asia and
Latin America are very good. A rising tide of trade
liberalization is improving the access of U.S. ex-
ports to these developing markets at the same time
that strong income growth and population growth
are expanding the size of those markets. In addition,
continued policy reforms in Latin America will free
domestic resources from debt service and ineffi-
cient state enterprises and create new demand for
U.S. capital and consumer goods.
Predicted U.S. export flows
Empirical estimates support the view that the
developing nations of East Asia and Latin America
will remain the foremost growth markets for U.S.
exports in the years ahead. Using income and popu-
lation growth forecasts, it is possible to predict the
flow of U.S. exports to East Asia, Latin America,
and the OECD by estimating what international
trade theorists call gravity equations. Such equa-
tions have been used successfully for over 30 years
in empirically estimating international trade flows
(Aitken; Bergstrand).
The gravity equations estimated for this article
use five independent variables: nominal output for
the United States and its trading partners, the popu-
lation of the trading partners, the distance between
the United States and its trading partners, and the
residuals from the prior year’s estimated regression.
The U.S. GDP variable represents the potential
export supply. Foreign country GDP is included to
measure the potential demand for U.S. exports.
Foreign population is a proxy to capture the effects
of market size.
20 The distance variable represents
natural trade resistance factors such as transportation
costs.
21 Finally, the residual term from the prior year
is included to explain the fact that the United States
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 77consistently conducts more trade with these coun-
tries than would be predicted by obvious trade
factors.
22 For example, the residual term may cap-
ture the unquantifiable effects of favorable trade
relationships, political orientation, or gradual trade
liberalization.
The objective is to predict export flows from
the United States to two separate groups of coun-
tries: the developing nations of East Asia and Latin
America, and the developed nations of the OECD.
Therefore, two separate gravity equations are esti-
mated, one for each of the two groups of trading
partners. The details of the estimation procedure are
described in the appendix.
The estimated regression equations are pre-
sented in Table 5. As expected, the coefficients on
U.S. GDP are positive because the more output the
United States produces, the more exports it can
supply. The foreign income coefficients are positive
for the developed and developing nations, indicat-
ing that higher foreign income raises the demand
for U.S. exports. The coefficients on the distance
variables are negative because countries located
farther from the United States have higher transpor-
tation costs imbedded in the price of U.S. exports.
Foreign population growth creates a larger market
for U.S. exports, making the expected sign of the
population coefficient positive.
23 In fact, the re-
ported population coefficient is positive for the
OECD. The reported population coefficient is nega-
tive, however, for the developing countries. This
may reflect the lingering impact of stringent trade
barriers that were part of import substitution poli-
cies in Latin American countries.
24 Many other
empirical studies using gravity equations have also
reported negative foreign population coefficients
Table 5
Gravity Regression Equations
Dependent variable: U.S. exports to region
Sample period: 1981-91
Independent variables Summary statistics











1.58 .55 .22 -1.01 .23 .82 .58
(.08) (.07) (.09) (.07) (.03)
East Asia and Latin America
.69 1.30 -.54 -.13 .12 .84 .39
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Note: Standard error in parentheses.
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These gravity equations are used to forecast the
future shares of U.S. exports to the developing and
developed nations considered in this article. The
future or out-of-sample values of the independent
variables are computed using nominal output and
population growth forecasts (Table 4). Given these
values, the predicted levels of U.S. exports are
generated in two steps. First, the estimated equa-
tions (Table 5) are used to compute separate time
series of predicted values for each country in the
two groups of trading partners. Second, predicted
aggregate time series of U.S. exports to each country
group are computed by summing the predicted time
series of all nations in each group.
The gravity regressions estimated here clearly
support the view that the share of U.S. exports to
East Asia and Latin America will continue to grow
faster than the share of U.S. exports to the OECD
(Chart 3). The forecasts indicate that the share of
U.S. exports to East Asia and Latin America will
exceed the share of U.S. exports to the OECD by
the year 2007. Given that only a portion of all Latin
American and East Asian developing countries are
included in this study, it is possible that this succes-
sion could happen sooner. Therefore, the results
presented are consistent with similar forecasts made
by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The
important point is not the specific year in which the
succession will occur, but that East Asia and Latin
America will be the primary growth markets for





Source:  Actual data from International Monetary Fund 1994.  Predicted data are fitted values from gravity regressions (see text).
Chart 3
Actual and Predicted U.S. Exports
Share of total U.S. exports to selected trading partners
Percent
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Two important trends have emerged in recent
U.S. export performance. First, U.S. exports have
been increasing rapidly relative to total U.S. output.
Second, a geographic shift in the direction of U.S.
exports is occurring as the developing nations of
East Asia and Latin America are consuming an
increasing share of U.S. exports. These developing
nations have accounted for most of the recent
growth in U.S. exports.
Several factors have contributed to this geo-
graphic shift in U.S. exports. Aggregate real income
growth has been faster in East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica than in the industrialized nations of the OECD.
Thus, spurred by strong domestic investment and
per capita income growth in East Asia and Latin
America, the market for U.S. exports in these de-
veloping nations has expanded rapidly. These fun-
damental economic trends have been augmented by
increased trade liberalization in East Asia and Latin
America, which has allowed U.S. exports greater
access to developing markets.
The shift in U.S. exports to East Asia and Latin
America is likely to continue in the future. The
economic fundamentals underlying rapid income
growth in East Asia remain in place, while contin-
ued trade liberalization promises greater access to
U.S. exports in these burgeoning markets. Through
measures like the NAFTA and the GATT, trade
liberalization is also opening markets to U.S. ex-
ports in Latin America. In addition, continued pol-
icy reforms and strong population growth will keep
Latin American markets expanding rapidly.
Forecasts presented in this article confirm that
U.S. exports to these developing nations will con-
tinue to grow faster than U.S. exports to the OECD
in coming years. The share of U.S. exports to East
Asia and Latin America is likely to surpass the share
of U.S. exports to the OECD during the first decade
of the 21st century. These forecasts are contingent
on current trade liberalization and policy reform
trends. The emergence of protectionism or reversal
of current policy reforms, while unlikely at present,
would damage world growth and impair the pros-
pects for U.S. exports.
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This appendix outlines the procedures used
to generate the forecasted shares of U.S. ex-
ports to developed and developing countries.
Estimation of gravity equations
Gravity equations were estimated using
annual data from a sample of countries in each
of two groups: the developed countries of the
OECD, and the developing countries of East
Asia and Latin America.
25 The estimation pro-
cedure comprised two steps.
First, annual gravity equations were esti-
mated for each of the two groups. For each year,
t, in the 1980-91 sample period, the gravity
equations took the form:
(1) x i
t = b1 + b2 y i
t + b3 n i
t + b4 di + e i
t ,
i = 1,..., Nj;  j = 1, 2,
where the subscript i indexes the N1 countries
in the developed group and the N2 countries
in the developing group. The dependent vari-
able xi
t represents U.S. exports to country i in
year t. Similarly, yi
t represents nominal GDP in
country i expressed in U.S. dollars, ni
t repre-
sents the population of country i, and di repre-
sents the distance in miles from country i to
the United States.
26 All variables were ex-
pressed in logarithms.
The second step in the estimation proce-
dure incorporated the estimated residual term
e ^i
t from the annual regressions in step one. The
estimated residual from the prior year was used
to capture unquantifiable factors, like political
orientation, that affect trade. The estimated re-
sidual was included as an independent variable
in a set of annual gravity equations used to
compose a system of seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR). To be specific, the following
set of equations was simultaneously estimated:
(2) xi
1981 = b1 yUS
1981  + b2 yi
1981 + b3ni
1981








1991 = b1 yUS
1991 + b2 yi
1991 + b3 ni
1991





t  is U.S. nominal GDP and e ^i
t-1 is the
once-lagged residual from equation (1). The
coefficients in system (2) were restricted to be
equal for each year in the sample. Thus, the
SUR technique reduced the system of annual
regressions to a single estimated equation over
the 1981-91 sample period. The SUR technique
also accounts for any contemporaneous corre-
lation in the error terms (Kmenta). Such corre-
lation occurs if a factor affecting one country’s
demand for U.S. exports affects other coun-
tries’ demand for U.S. exports.
Computation of export shares
Using the estimated coefficients from equa-
tion (2), predicted export shares were computed
for both developing and developed countries.
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1 Melcher and Kelly report that from the first quarter of 1993
to the first quarter of 1994, exports from the Midwest rose at
twice the national rate.
2 The industrialized economies are generally considered to
be the member nations of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD nations
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Although it became
a member of the OECD on May 18, 1994, Mexico would still
be more accurately considered a developing nation by
virtually all observers. In addition, for the sample period
examined, Mexico was not a member of the OECD.
Therefore, in this article Mexico is classified as a developing
country in Latin America. Iceland is excluded from the
analysis. Since the article is written from the perspective of
U.S. trade, the term OECD is understood to exclude the
United States.
The developing countries in East Asia considered in this
article include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand. Latin America’s developing countries consid-
ered here include Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela. Although they exclude some coun-
tries, these regional definitions are economically comprehen-
sive in that they include all nations that have a significant
trading relationship with the United States, as indicated by the
data in the Direction of Trade Statistics (International Mone-
tary Fund 1994).
3 Recent reform efforts have also focused attention on
economic development in the economies of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union (Barkema). However, these
studies have generally concluded that the progress of reform
in those countries will be slow and uneven. In addition, many
organizations do not strictly classify Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union as developing economies, categorizing
them separately as “formerly socialist economies” or
“economies in transition” (World Bank 1993). For these
reasons, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are
excluded from the analysis of this article.
Another nation often mentioned as a potential economic
power is India. However, India is not included in this article
for two reasons. First, India is not located in the geographic
regions that are the focus of this article. Second, despite its
formidable potential for economic growth, India has actually
consumed a steadily declining share of U.S. exports since
1964.
4 Given the prevailing fixed exchange rate system, the dollar
was overvalued in the sense that the supply of dollars greatly
exceeded the private demand for dollars (Economic Report
of the President).
5 The link between lower trade barriers and higher trade
volumes has been well established (Harris).
6 Although the discussion here is focused on tariff protection,
First, for each country in the two groups
(developed countries and developing countries),
the estimated coefficients were used to com-
pute predicted (fitted) values. The predicted
values, U.S. exports to each nation, were then










where x ^ i
t represents the fitted values for coun-
try i in country group j. The aggregate predicted
values X ^ j
t were then used to compute the shares
in Chart 3.
82 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthere are other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that nations often
employ to restrict imports. Some of the more common NTBs
are quotas, “voluntary” export restraints, and local content
requirements. The GATT has also been instrumental in
working to reduce NTBs through the principle of
transparency. This principle calls for countries to convert
NTBs into tariffs that are transparent or easily identified. The
idea behind transparency is that trade barriers must be clearly
identified before they can be lowered or eliminated.
7 A restrictive monetary policy and an expansionary fiscal
policy combined to drive up real interest rates in the United
States relative to the rest of the world. Thus, aided also by
increased investment risk in Latin American debtor countries,
foreign demand for U.S. assets rose. The tight U.S. monetary
policy also reduced expectations of U.S. inflation. All of these
factors combined to increase the demand for the U.S. dollar
and raise its value relative to other currencies (Economic
Report of the President).
8 In comparing levels of per capita GDP between countries,
an exchange rate is needed to state all measures of income in
terms of a common currency. Accurate comparisons require
that this exchange rate reflect the differences in purchasing
power of the respective currencies. This is especially
important for comparisons between developing and
developed countries. Converting data at conventional
exchange rates tends to understate the income of developing
countries (Summers and Heston). Therefore, all per capita
GDP figures used in this article are calculated from data that
were converted using purchasing power parity exchange
rates. For an explanation of purchasing power parity, see
Hakkio.
9 Chirinko and Morris note that there is a direct positive
relationship between investment and economic growth across
a large sample of countries.
10 In terms of the Solow or neoclassical growth model, an
increase in an economy’s investment will increase the
equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio. The economy will move to
a higher point along the production function, thus increasing
the equilibrium output-to-labor ratio, that is, productivity. For
an illustration of this model, see Branson.
11 Young identifies high investment to GDP ratios, increased
educational attainment, and a transfer of labor from low to
high value-added sectors as the primary factors underlying
the strong productivity growth in East Asia.
12 Private investment can be “crowded out” if it is inversely
related to interest rates. Increased government spending will
raise interest rates if the government borrows to finance its
spending or if financial market participants believe that the
government will have to borrow more in the future. Higher
interest rates generally depress investment because most
investment spending is financed by borrowed funds. For a
more detailed discussion of crowding out, see Gordon.
13 Capital flight occurred primarily because governments
attempted to fix the value of their currencies at overvalued
exchange rates. Once again, Latin America was much more
severely affected than East Asia. In Argentina and Mexico,
for example, about two-thirds of the increase in gross external
debt went to finance private capital flight (Sachs). The
corresponding figure for Korea and Indonesia was an average
of 15 percent.
14 Import-substituting industrialization is the policy of
restricting imports of manufactured goods in order to
encourage the development of domestic manufacturing
industries. This policy was widely practiced in many
developing countries, especially in Latin America, after
World War II. Import substitution was implemented in
response to an anticipated slackening of demand for the
primary goods which predominated among developing
country exports (Balassa and others). Most economists,
however, now consider import-substituting industrialization
to be a flawed development policy because it is based on the
infant industry argument. Proponents of the infant industry
argument contend that nascent manufacturing industries in
developing countries cannot initially compete with
established industries in developed countries. Therefore,
proponents advocate the use of trade barriers to restrict
imports and “protect” infant industries until they can develop
a comparative advantage. For a discussion of the problems
with the infant industry argument and import substitution, see
Krugman and Obstfeld.
15 Seven Latin American nations have acceded to the GATT
since 1980. These nations are Colombia, Belize, Mexico,
Antigua and Barbuda, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Costa Rica
(OECD 1992).
16 These growth forecasts, like any other, are based upon a
number of different assumptions regarding future economic
conditions. Most importantly, the forecasts reflect continued
moderate growth and low inflation in the industrialized
nations, conditions which are expected to keep world interest
rates at relatively low levels. These forecasts come from the
World Bank (1994b), which also computed forecasts under
the assumption of rising world interest rates and protectionist
trade pressures. Even under these pessimistic assumptions,
East Asia’s annual real GDP growth is forecast to be 7.1
percent over the next ten years. Due to its larger debt exposure
and greater dependence on foreign capital, Latin America’s
real output growth is more severely affected under the
pessimistic scenario, growing at an annual rate of 0.8 percent.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 8317 Edwards 1994 identifies 1988 as the beginning of a
widespread reform era in Latin America.
18 Lardy points out that total U.S. exports to China are
probably even somewhat higher than reported by official
data, since some U.S. goods exported to Hong Kong actually
end up as reexports to China.
19 Private capital flows to Latin America reached a low point
of $6.3 billion in 1986. Since that time, private capital flows
to Latin America have steadily increased, reaching an
estimated $37.6 billion in 1992, an increase of almost 600
percent over six years (OECD 1993).
20 As discussed earlier in the article, population is an
important determinant of aggregate income. Therefore,
countries with large populations are likely to consume more
U.S. exports than countries with small populations.
21 In this article, distance is measured as the number of miles
from Kansas City, Missouri, to one of the major industrial
cities in each relevant country. Kansas City was chosen as the
reference point because it is a large city that is closest to the
geographic center of the United States. The cities chosen as
reference points in the other countries are: Sydney, Australia;
Vienna, Austria; Brussels, Belgium; Winnipeg, Canada;
Santiago, Chile; Beijing, China; Bogota, Colombia;
Copenhagen, Denmark; Quito, Ecuador; Helsinki, Finland;
Paris, France; Frankfurt, Germany; Athens, Greece; Hong
Kong; Jakarta, Indonesia; Dublin, Ireland; Rome, Italy;
Tokyo, Japan; Luxembourg-Ville, Luxembourg; Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia; Mexico City, Mexico; Amsterdam, the
Netherlands; Wellington, New Zealand; Oslo, Norway;
Panama City, Panama; Manila, the Philippines; Lisbon,
Portugal; Singapore; Seoul, South Korea; Madrid, Spain;
Stockholm, Sweden; Bern, Switzerland; Bangkok, Thailand;
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Ankara, Turkey;
London, United Kingdom; Caracas, Venezuela. The distance
measures are from Fitzpatrick and Modlin.
22 The inclusion of the lagged residual variable improves the
fit (increases the R2), but does not significantly alter the
parameter estimates. The objective here is to use the estimated
regression equation to accurately predict trade flows.
Therefore, the inclusion of the lagged residual term is
justified for the sake of improved fit.
23 Brada and Méndez also suggest that a large export market
better compensates exporters for the cost of acquiring
information and establishing a sales and distribution network.
24 For countries that adopt import substitution policies, as
many in Latin America have done since World War II, the
population coefficient in a gravity equation should be
negative. That is, foreign countries with import substitution
policies and large populations may have sufficient economies
of scale to support import substituting industries, thus
reducing the demand for U.S. exports. This conclusion was
supported by exploratory regression analysis. When separate
gravity equations were estimated for East Asia and Latin
America, the population coefficient was positive for East Asia
and negative for Latin America.
25 For a list of the countries in each group, see note 2.
26 For more details on the distance measurements, see
note 21.
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